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Evidence assembled in this special issue of Food Policy shows that rising rural population densities in
parts of Africa are profoundly affecting farming systems and the region’s economies in ways that are
underappreciated in current discourse on African development issues. This study synthesizes how peo-
ple, markets and governments are responding to rising land pressures in Africa, drawing on key ﬁndings
from the various contributions in this special issue. The papers herein revisit the issue of Boserupian
agricultural intensiﬁcation as an important response to land constraints, but they also go further than
Boserup and her followers to explore broader responses to land constraints, including non-farm diversi-
ﬁcation, migration, and reduced fertility rates. Agricultural and rural development strategies in the region
will need to more fully anticipate the implications of Africa’s rapidly changing land and demographic sit-
uation, and the immense challenges that mounting land pressures pose in the context of current evidence
of unsustainable agricultural intensiﬁcation, a rapidly rising labor force associated with the region’s cur-
rent demographic conditions, and limited nonfarm job creation. These challenges are manageable but
will require explicit policy actions to address the unique development challenges in densely populated
rural areas.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).Introduction
This special issue is motivated by evidence that rising rural pop-
ulation densities in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa1 – combined with
policy choices, broadly deﬁned – are profoundly affecting farming
systems and indeed the overall trajectory of economic systems in
ways that are underappreciated in current discourse on the region’s
development. Contributions to this special issue show that rising
population pressure is linked in one way or another to (i) the shrink-
ing size of most smallholder farms over time; (ii) more continuous
cultivation of ﬁelds, contributing to land degradation and unsustain-
able forms of agricultural intensiﬁcation; (iii) the rise of land rental
and purchase markets and changes in land allocation institutions, all
of which are rapidly altering farm structure; and (iv) the challenges
that Sub-Saharan Africa is currently experiencing in achieving
broad-based and inclusive forms of farm income growth.The extent, distribution and exploitation of land are factors that
have long been identiﬁed as fundamental inﬂuences on agricul-
tural development paths and poverty reduction (Malthus, 1798;
Boserup, 1965; Ruthenberg, 1980; Binswanger and McIntire,
1987; Binswanger and Pingali, 1988). There is no reason why this
statement should be less true in sub-Saharan Africa than in other
regions, yet recent research and policy discourses have largely mis-
identiﬁed or underestimated the heterogeneous nature of Africa’s
land endowment. Africa is typically characterized as land abun-
dant, with the implication that land endowments pose no serious
constraint for agricultural development. At the continental level,
this is true. Estimates show that 52% of the world’s remaining ara-
ble land is in Africa (Deininger et al., 2011). Yet most of this land is
concentrated in just eight countries, while a number of the remain-
ing countries contain large rural populations clustered in remark-
ably small areas (Chamberlin et al., 2014). Africa is equally
heterogeneous at disaggregated levels. Just 1% of Africa’s rural land
area contains 21% of its rural population, while 20% of its rural
lands contain 82% of its rural people. The most densely populated
20% of Africa’s arable lands contain 25 times more people than the
least densely populated 20%.
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population density is the recognition of Africa’s spatially heteroge-
neous distributions of rural populations, giving rise to acute local-
ized land pressures being experienced by many rural Africans co-
existing with large swaths of apparently unutilized arable land in
other parts of the region. Although policy discourses typically iden-
tify challenges facing agricultural development in sub-Saharan
Africa as a whole, these ‘‘two Africas’’ – land abundant and land
constrained – may face fundamentally different challenges, with
commensurately different implications for the types of develop-
ment strategies that are best pursued in each.
Africa is currentlywitnessing intense competition for fertile land
and water among four main groups: rural communities (mostly
smallholder farmers) that are continuing to experience population
growth,2 relatively wealthy urban-based people who are investing
in land at a rapid pace, foreign companies attracted to Africa’s abun-
dant and relatively cheap supply of agricultural land, and national
governments. State leaders have long recognized the political-eco-
nomic dimensions of control over the allocation of land (Herbst,
2000). In recent years, as land values have risen dramatically in parts
of the region, states have tended tomore aggressivelywrest control of
it from traditional authorities (Deininger et al., 2011). Demand for fer-
tile land in Africa will almost certainly intensify along with rapidly
increasing global demand for food, in part because the potential for
crop area (and water use) expansion in North America, Europe and
most of Asia is very limited (Deininger et al., 2011).
This special issue of Food Policy has three broad objectives. The
ﬁrst is to determine the extent to which land availability is a con-
straint on income growth in densely populated rural areas, and to
identify different sources of constraints to land expansion.
Chamberlin et al. (2014) revisit the question of how much poten-
tially arable cropland exists in sub-Saharan Africa using recent
high-resolution spatial data, and building on previous research
by using available farm budgets to model the proﬁtability of
small-scale and large-scale expansion into new areas. They also
discuss the many constraints to cropland expansion, including
infrastructure, disease burdens, agroecological limitations and
institutional factors. Other papers go deeper into the institutional
constraints to cropland expansion and redistribution, with a focus
on land markets (Holden and Otsuka, 2014) and land governance
(Deininger et al., 2014, 2011). Schoneveld (2014) provides perhaps
the most detailed and carefully documented inventory of foreign
large-scale land acquisitions in Africa. Other studies explore the
factors driving the apparent meteoric rise of medium-scale farm-
ers, who now control more farmland than small-scale farmers in
some countries (Sitko and Jayne, 2014, for the case of Zambia;
see also Jayne et al., 2014).
A second objective is to document how African farming systems
are responding to these varying land constraints. As noted above,
many works in the agricultural development literature have
extended Boserup’s seminal study (1965) examining the endoge-
nous intensiﬁcation of farming systems in response to mounting
land contraints.3 However, until recently it has been difﬁcult to
empirically test Boserup’s ideas because of the difﬁculty of merging
localized agro-ecological conditions with farm panel survey data.
Several of the articles in this issue have now done so using geo-ref-
erenced spatial data to examine farmer behavioral responses to vari-
ations in localized population density (Muyanga and Jayne, 2014;
Headey et al., 2014; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2014; Josephson et al.,
2014). Two Ghanaian case studies focus on the very different context
of agricultural area expansion incentivized by labor and power con-2 Africa is the world’s only region where rural population is still growing – by a
projected 48% between 2012 and 2050 (United Nations, 2013).
3 See for example Binswanger and Ruttan, 1978; Ruthenberg, 1980; Binswanger
and Pingali, 1988; Binswanger and McIntire, 1987.straints, what this implies for the demand for agricultural mechani-
zation (Diao et al., 2014) and whether this context is amenable to an
Asian-style Green Revolution or some other agricultural develop-
ment path (Nin-Pratt and McBride, 2014). Finally, several studies
compare the different agricultural intensiﬁcation paths of Africa
and Asia, the two developing regions that are most pervasively dom-
inated by smallholder farming (Headey and Jayne, 2014; Mellor,
2014; Liu and Yamauchi, 2014).
A third objective, however, is to go beyond the traditional agro-
centric Boserupian approach by acknowledging the fundamental
importance of the non-farm sector in providing opportunities for
responding to land pressures, as well as the potential for demo-
graphic responses in the form of out-migration from land con-
strained areas, or reductions in fertility rates. Mellor revisits the
theory and evidence on the linkages between smallholder com-
mercial farms and broader economic development, while Headey
and Jayne examine cross-country evidence of the thus far sluggish
pace of diversiﬁcation out of smallholder farming in Africa, as well
as responses in achieved and desired fertility rates.
This article synthesizes the main ﬁndings from the special issue
and considers how they inform a central policy question: Given
whatwe nowknowabout the continent’s complex land and popula-
tion dynamics, what are the implications for Africa’s development
strategies? Building on a wide range of existing literatures, the var-
ious studies in this issue provide a ﬁrmer evidence base for inform-
ing this question in a more holistic manner. Spatially, we have a
much better sense now of where the potential for land expansion
is limited and therefore where land productivity growth will be
required for smallholder agricultural growth. Andwhile input inten-
siﬁcationwill be increasingly important in densely populated areas,
evidence suggests that heavy investments in soil fertility restoration
will be required to create the conditions for proﬁtable and sustain-
able intensiﬁcation (Drechsel et al., 2001; Tittonell andGiller, 2013).
Most country studies in this special issue indicate limits to endoge-
nous agriculture intensiﬁcation in terms of a declining relationship
between the value of net farm income per land and labor unit and
population density at high levels of density (Ricker-Gilbert et al.,
2014; Muyanga and Jayne, 2014; Headey et al., 2014; Josephson
et al., 2014). Problems of diminishing returns to agriculture at high
levels of rural population density were relieved or avoided in much
of Asia through exploitation of irrigation potential as well as
through competitive outward-looking non-farm sectors that greatly
rewarded personal investment in education and migration (Liu and
Yamauchi, 2014). Labor was essentially ‘‘pulled’’ out of rural areas
into urban-based employment. There still remains great potential
for such processes to unfold in Africa (with appropriate policies
and incentives), and in some countries, such as Ghana, these pro-
cesses are already somewhat advanced (Diao et al., 2014; Nin-
Pratt and McBride, 2014).4 Perhaps the most important overarching
conclusion, articulated by Mellor, is that we should not interpret
missed opportunities as a lost cause; decades of policies and regres-
sive public investment patterns may have created an unbalanced
playing ﬁeld for African smallholders and depressed their role in driv-
ing forward structural transformation, but Asia’s green revolutions
were powered by small-scale farms and provide hope for what Africa
might achieve with similarly supportive policies and public expendi-
tures (Mellor, 2014).
The remainder of this synthesis paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 elaborates on the various stylized facts raised above,4 It is important to note, however, that the urban manufacturing sector featured
heavily in the Asian transformation, while manufacturing is a notably weak
component of most of Africa’s urbanization, which may impose signiﬁcant limitations
on how structural transformation plays out. See Glaeser (2013), Jedwab (2013) and
Gollin et al. (2013) for recent assessments of urbanization without growth and
poverty reduction, which appears to characterize much of Africa.
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across Africa’s land area, the institutional distribution of land
within countries, and the under-emphasized secular trends in farm
sizes across the ‘‘two Africas’’. Section 3 describes the various ways
in which farming systems and rural populations are responding to
rising population density and land pressures. Section 4 describes
important changes in the regions’ rural landscape, including the
advent of large-scale land investments (the so-called ‘‘land grab’’
phenomena), the increasing importance of medium-scale farmers,
the pressures on traditional land allocation institutions, and the
rise of land markets. Section 5 summarizes our basic ﬁndings,
and discusses the policy implications of the ﬁndings in this special
issue.Scarcity amidst abundance: the nexus of land and labor in rural
Africa
One objective of this special issue was to better understand the
nexus between land resources and demographic forces, including
birth and migration rates, and historical settlement patterns.
Toward this end, we identify four stylized facts emerging from
the assembled evidence.Fact 1: Africa has surplus land, but it is concentrated within relatively
few countries
The magnitude of land available for cropland expansion is still
not well established, despite the large number of estimates pro-
duced over the last decade.5 A key point illustrated by Chamberlin
et al. (2014) is that estimates of potentially available cropland
(PAC) are very sensitive to assumptions about what constitutes
‘‘potentially available’’ (and to a lesser extent to different data
sources). There seems to be a consensus that arable land is abundant
in the region as a whole, although exactly how much of this stock is
utilizable (and by whom) is far from clear. Many estimates have
emphasized the production potential of unutilized land, drawing
on geo-referenced data on land and climate characteristics and asso-
ciated biophysical production characteristics,6 with relatively little
emphasis on the extent to which unutilized land is already ‘‘owned’’,
or the forces shaping the current and future allocation of remaining
arable lands.
A striking aspect of the distribution of ‘‘potentially available
cropland’’ is that, from a regional perspective, much of Africa’s
unutilized arable land is found in just a few countries
(Chamberlin et al., 2014; Deininger et al., 2011). Depending upon
the deﬁnitions and assumptions used, as much as 90% of SSA’s
unutilized arable land is located in just 6–8 countries (Table 1).
In 4 of these countries (DRC, Congo Republic, Gabon, and Camer-
oon), surplus lands are primarily under dense tropical forests, rep-
resenting a regional resource pool of considerable importance.
Even when excluding forested lands, the concentration of unuti-
lized arable land is remarkable and involves mostly this same set
of countries.7 The corollary of this is that many African countries
have limited potential for area expansion.5 See FAO, 1981, 1984; Alexandratos, 1995; Luyten, 1995; Fischer and Heilig, 1998;
Ramankutty et al., 2002; Cassman and Wood, 2005; Fischer and Shah, 2010 (utilized
by Deininger et al., 2011), Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012), and Lambin et al.
(2013).
6 Young (2005) notes that most of these studies draw on the same source
information, i.e. what is now codiﬁed as IASA/FAO’s GAEZ database, although the
current version has certainly evolved from earlier incarnations.
7 The relative ranking of some land-abundant countries, like Zambia, Angola and
Madagascar, is highly dependent upon whether or not forests are included, as well as
on how forests are measured in land cover data used in such analysis.Estimates of the stock of PAC from these estimates for SSA have
ranged from 200 to more than 500 million hectares. (Young 1999,
2005) has been a vocal critic of such estimates, noting that they
simply do not conform with on-the-ground realities or statistical
regularities of smallholder agriculture in the region, particularly
the widespread expansion onto marginal lands and the shrinking
of farm sizes in many countries. On the basis of these observations,
he challenges the integrity of the data used in land balance assess-
ments, suggesting that accounting is likely ﬂawed by overestima-
tion of cultivable land, underestimation of land already
cultivated, underestimation of competing non-agricultural land
uses, or all three (Young, 1999).
Lambin et al. (2013) similarly attempt to tone down the enthu-
siasm of earlier estimates by noting that a wide range of con-
straints and tradeoffs are typically left out of such accounting
methods. They employ a ‘‘bottom up’’ approach to identify a num-
ber of social, administrative, economic and physical constraints to
conversion of potential croplands. They conclude that there is
‘‘substantially less potential additional cropland than is generally
assumed once constraints and trade-offs are taken into account’’
(p 892).
In their analysis of cropland expansion potential in SSA,
Chamberlin et al. (2014) focus on the quantity of land that would
be economically viable for production from a smallholder perspec-
tive. Like Young and Lambin et al., Chamberlin et al. conclude that
– under current infrastructural conditions, production technologies
and farm productivity levels much of the region’s potentially avail-
able cropland is either economically unviable or effectively out of
reach for the majority of smallholder farmers. Using these ﬁgures
from Chamberlin et al., (2014), Jayne et al. (2014) estimate that
the quantity of land available for cropland expansion as a percent-
age of total arable land ranges from 68% in Zambia to only 22–24%
in Kenya and Ghana.
The concentration of surplus land resources in just a few coun-
tries – many of them afﬂicted by long-running civil conﬂicts means
that even improving roads and reducing yield gaps will not be suf-
ﬁcient to improve access to land for smallholders in high-density
areas. Furthermore, Chamberlin et al. (2014) argue that their esti-
mates are conservative owing to data limitations on other expan-
sion constraints which are known to be important. For example,
in qualitative work for several of the country case studies featured
in this special issue, farmers cited human and zoonotic diseases as
additional constraints, as well as lack of public services and infra-
structure, and fundamental agronomic differences between places
of origin and potential migration destinations (e.g. the stark differ-
ences between the Ethiopian highlands and lowlands). Fortunately,
many of these constraints on smallholder area expansion can be
relieved by policy actions.
Fact 2: Despite aggregate land abundance, many African farmers have
limited potential for land expansion and are experiencing declining
farm sizes
After excluding the few African countries where most of the
unutilized arable land is located, the remaining 40 or so countries
are either already land constrained, or close to approaching the
full extent of their arable land area (Chamberlin et al., 2014).
The list of countries with little surplus land remaining includes
some of Africa’s most populous countries (Nigeria, Ethiopia,
Uganda) as well as countries where land pressures have contrib-
uted to fomenting civil conﬂicts (Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi). In east
and southern Africa, the amount of arable land has risen only
marginally over the 1980–2010 period, but the percentage of
households engaged in agriculture has grown threefold. Table 2
separates African countries for which we have farm size data into
land constrained and land abundant groups. In most of the land-
Table 2
Patterns and trends in farm sizes in land constrained and land abundant Africa. Source: Data collected by Headey and Jayne (2014). The data are a mixture of agricultural census
and survey data, and must therefore be treated with some caution.
Country Year Average farm size Country Year Average farm size
Land constrained Africaa Land abundant Africaa
Ethiopia 1977 1.4 Botswana 2004 1.9
1990 0.8 Burkina Faso 1993 3.9
2002 1.0 Cameroon 1972 1.6
2012 1.0 Cote d’Ivoire 1974 5.0
Kenya 1974 4.1 2001 3.9
1980 2.5 Ghana 1970 3.2
1997 2.4 1999 2.8
2004 2.5 2006 3.2
2010 2.1 Madagascar 1961 1.0
Malawi 1969 1.5 1980 1.3
1981 1.2 2005 0.9
1990 0.7 Mali 1960 4.4
2009 1.4 1980 3.3
Nigeria 1994 2.5 2005 4.1
2010 1.4 Senegal 1998 4.3
Rwanda 1980 1.2 Tanzania 1970 1.3
2006 0.7 1996 1.0
Uganda 1963 3.3 2003 2.4
1991 2.2 Zambia 1970 3.1
1996 1.6 2001 3.6
2006 0.9 2008 3.7
Average (latest year) 1.2 Average (latest year) 3.0
a Deﬁned as countries with population per square km of agricultural land greater than (less than) 100 people.
Table 1
Land availability in African countries.
Non-forested unutilized landa (1000s Ha) Proportion (%) Cumulative proportion (%)
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 84824 46.5 46.5
Angola 18889 10.4 56.9
Congo 12872 7.1 63.9
Zambia 10834 5.9 69.9
Cameroon 10447 5.7 75.6
Mozambique 8994 4.9 80.5
Central African Republic 7049 3.9 84.4
Gabon 6534 3.6 88.0
Sudan 5803 3.2 91.2
Tanzania 4313 2.4 93.5
Madagascar 2718 1.5 95.0
Zimbabwe 2142 1.2 96.2
Chad 1520 0.8 97.0
South Africa 1219 0.7 97.7
Kenya 807 0.4 98.2
Mali 800 0.4 98.6
Burkina Faso 655 0.4 99.0
Ethiopia 651 0.4 99.3
Rest of Africa 1259 0.7 100.0
Notes: Estimates of underutilized land extents are drawn from Fischer and Shah (2010). The methods are explained in Chapter 3 of Deininger et al. (2011).
a Deﬁned by Deininger and Byerlee as land under 25 persons per km2.
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4 T.S. Jayne et al. / Food Policy 48 (2014) 1–17constrained countries most smallholder farms are gradually
shrinking. Headey and Jayne (2014) estimate that average farm
sizes in this group of countries have shrunk by 30–40% since
the 1970s. Land inequality is also very high, particularly Kenya
(with a Gini coefﬁcient of 0.55) and Nigeria (with a Gini of
0.70), with evidence of rising Gini coefﬁcients over time (Jayne
et al., 2014). In these countries average farm sizes greatly exceed
the farm size of the median farmer. Between 1994 and 2006, the
proportion of Kenya’s farms smaller than one hectare rose from
45 to 74%. However, over the same period, average farm size
among farms over 8 ha grew by 230%, from 13.2 to 31.1 ha
(Jayne et al., 2014). These developments underscore the potential
for misinterpretation of changes in mean farm size over time. The
rise in the number of medium-scale farms in recent years may
raise mean farm sizes even as the majority of farms are declining
in size (Jayne et al., 2014).Fact 3: Africa’s rural populations are highly clustered, in both land
abundant and land constrained settings
Rural populations in Africa exhibit high degrees of spatial clus-
tering. Linard et al. (2012), using detailed information on spatial
population distributions for 2010, ﬁnd that 90% of Sub-Saharan
Africa’s population is concentrated in less than 21% of its land sur-
face. Using the same database to undertake similar analysis for
rural areas, we ﬁnd similar degrees of spatial clustering in rural set-
tlement patterns.8 For the region as a whole, 82% of the rural popu-
lation is found to reside in only 20% of total rural land area, and 62%
reside within just 10% of this area (Table 3). Even when considering
areas with more than 400 mm of average annual rainfall, similarSee Table A1 for country-speciﬁc results and data and methodological details.
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rural area, and more than half reside in just 10% of the rural areas.
Table 3 also presents the rural population densities correspond-
ing to these land areas (shown in the last four columns). For exam-
ple, for the 40% of the rural population of East/Central Africa that
resides in the most densely populated 5% of rural land area, the
mean population density experienced by this 40% of the population
is 264 persons per km2. West Africa is somewhat less densely clus-
tered: the top 5% of rural grid cells contain 28% of the rural popu-
lation, but the mean population density in these areas is
comparable to that of East/Central Africa at 268 persons per km2.
Thus, this clustering exists across land abundant and land con-
strained countries, although it tends to be more concentrated in
land constrained countries.
Rural clustering in Africa has long been a recognized feature of
Africa’s geography.9 The factorswhich condition rural population dis-
tributions include agroecological production potential (a function of
many biophysical elements, including temperature, rainfall, soil qual-
ity, etc.), disease burdens, infrastructure andmarket access conditions,
conﬂict, colonial policies concentrating indigenous populations in par-
ticular areas and post-independence land reforms (Clarke and
Kosinski, 1982; Binswanger and Pingali, 1988). Although spatial clus-
tering of populations is not unique to Africa, such rural clustering does
speak to limited ability and/or willingness of rural labor in densely
populated areas to relocate to the region’s land ‘‘surplus’’ areas. 10Fact 4. Africa’s rural population will continue to grow for the next
40 years
A ﬁnal and emerging cause of increased land scarcity in Africa
concerns the region’s unique demographic trends. There are two
relevant features of this trend. First, Africa is the only region in
the world that will experience continued rural population growth
until 2050. Rural Africa’s population is estimated to be 48% larger
in 2050 than it is now. Fig. 1 shows that Africa will have as many
rural people as in China and southeast Asia combined by 2050. In
contrast, China is already experiencing declining rural populations,
and most of Asia will do so by 2030.
Second, Africa is only beginning its demographic transition, and
the share of young people in the total population will be unusually
high for the next several decades. In 2015, 63% of its rural popula-
tion will be under 25 years of age (Fig. 2). Roughly 122 million
young people will enter the labor force between 2010 and 2020,
with slightly more than half of them from rural areas, putting
immense pressure on both agriculture and non-farm sectors to
generate employment opportunities. However, even under highly
favorable conditions, Fine et al. (2012) estimate that non-farm sec-
tors can generate only 70 million wage jobs over this same period,
mainly in manufacturing, retailing, hospitality, and government.
This means that farming will be called upon to provide gainful
employment for at least a third of Africa’s young labor force
(Losch, 2012). However, for agriculture to effectively fulﬁll this
mandate, young people growing up in densely populated areas will
require access to farm technologies that are radically more produc-
tive and proﬁtable, as well as access to new land.11 Hence, even as
Africa becomes progressively urbanized, smallholder agriculture will9 See, for example, Maro and Mlay’s (1982) descriptions of pre-Ujamaa rural
population clustering in Tanzania.
10 Note that the foregoing treatment of land scarcity does not engage with
institutional constraints to access, such as existing claims on land by traditional
authorities, increasingly gazetted lands, or the so-called ‘‘new African enclosures’’
which may exclude a considerable portion of would-be cultivators from expanding
(Woodhouse, 2003).
11 The fact that yield gaps remain on the order of 80% in Africa for current
technologies (Deininger et al., 2011) suggests that the existence of improved
technologies is not sufﬁcient to guarantee their implementation.remain fundamental for absorbing much of Africa’s burgeoning
young labor force into gainful employment (Losch, 2012).
A related consequence of Africa’s demographic ‘‘youth bulge’’ is
that intergenerational subdivision of land will constrain the
options of rural youth entering the labor force. Intergenerational
and inter-sibling conﬂicts may intensify further because rural par-
ents in their 50s and 60s may not yet be ready or able to ‘‘retire’’
and bequeath their land assets to their children, or otherwise sub-
divide their land. Inheritance of land, long considered a birthright
of people growing up in rural areas, will be increasingly difﬁcult.
In Kenya, roughly a quarter of young men and women born in rural
areas start their families without inheriting any land from their
parents, forcing them to either commit themselves to off-farm
employment (including migration), to renting land, or to buying
land from an increasingly active land sales market (Yamano
et al., 2009). Land-related intergenerational conﬂicts are also likely
to rise when younger family members have to rely on land as a
source of livelihood as a result of limited non-agricultural income
generating opportunities. Youth returning home from cities
reproach elderly members for selling or renting out too much land
to migrants (Ngaido, 1993; Le Meur, 2006). Evidence from North-
ern Tanzania shows that as land increases in value due to emerging
commercial interests, fathers are less willing to provide land to
their children, which further increases the prevalence of intergen-
erational conﬂict (Le Meur and Odgaard, 2006). Land-related con-
ﬂicts may be part of broader processes undergirding recent
evidence of a strong correlation between countries prone to civil
conﬂicts and those with burgeoning youth populations (e.g.,
Fuller, 1995; Beehner, 2007).
In summary, SSA is clearly very heterogeneous and many coun-
tries do not yet suffer from land scarcity (to the extent we can
detect it through labor-land ratios). However, most of the region’s
rural people already live in relatively highly densely populated
areas where the potential for crop area expansion is very limited.
The demographic forecasts for the region suggest that the scarcity
of land resources will intensify over the next several decades.Household responses to land scarcity
The foregoing suggests that rural Africans will face increasing
difﬁculties in accessing land. Land scarcity will give rise to adapta-
tion and dynamic changes in farming and broader socio-economic
systems. Behavioral responses to land scarcity are anticipated to
follow ﬁve main pathways. First, following the pioneering works
of Boserup (1965) and Ruthenberg (1980), rising population den-
sity tends to intensify the use of land (essentially, the application
of more inputs – including labor – per unit of land). Other impor-
tant household responses to rising population density include: (ii)
shifting labor to rural non-farm activities, (iii) migration to other
rural areas; (iv) migration to urban areas, and (v) reductions in fer-
tility rates (Bilsborrow, 1987; Headey and Jayne, 2014). Fig. 3 pro-
vides a pictorial summarization of our framework for analyzing the
causes and consequences of rising land pressures, and the factors
inﬂuencing the particular behavioral responses that households
adopt. This section considers the evidence on the extent to which
– and how – these ﬁve responses play out in practice.Land intensiﬁcation: sustainable and unsustainable modes
Many papers in this issue ﬁnd evidence of Boserupian intensiﬁ-
cation in response to rising population density, both across coun-
tries (Headey and Jayne, 2014) and based on micro survey data
(e.g. Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2014; Muyanga and Jayne, 2014;
Josephson et al., 2014, and Headey et al., 2014). However, there
are two major qualiﬁcations.
Table 3
Clustering of rural populations in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Region Percentage of rural population residing within Average population density within
1% 5% 10% 20% 1% 5% 10% 20% 1% 5% 10% 20% 1% 5% 10% 20%
of total rural land area of total rural land area (excluding low rainfall areas)a of total rural land area of rural land area weighted by quality
East/Central 18 45 65 83 16 42 59 76 525 264 180 112 721 389 277 179
Southern 17 42 61 79 14 37 53 70 267 129 89 58 388 204 141 93
West 13 35 54 75 12 30 45 64 512 268 195 135 929 451 316 216
SSA 17 43 62 82 16 38 55 74 469 235 162 105 709 365 254 166
a Low rainfall areas are deﬁned as receiving less than 400 mm average annual rainfall. Only rural areas are considered. Population data come from GRUMP for 2010 (Balk and
Yetman, 2004).Weconsider populationwithin rural areas only, and carry out our analysis on thebasis of 5 minpixels. Quality-weighted densities shown in the last 4 columns are
constructed as the number of persons divided by land weighted by its potential productivity measured as potential kilocalories of the most productive of 6 staple crops (maize,
wheat, sorghum, rice, beans and banana). The weight is constructed such that land capable of producing at or above the 80th percentile (calculated for the agricultural extent
within SSA) have land area valued at 100% (i.e. a hectare is a hectare), and less productive land is discounted linearly, such that a hectare of landwhich is half as productive as the
baseline value is given an effective land area of 0.5 ha. This discounting is given a minimum value of 0.1, such that hectare is re-scaled to values less than a tenth of a hectare.
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quite different from that of high-density Asia. Intensiﬁcation in
Asia featured increased use of fertilizer per hectare, irrigation
investments, increased mechanization, and impressive cereal yield
growth. This is in stark contrast to many areas of Africa where the
net value of output per unit land has increased more slowly and
unevenly over time and has been mainly associated with more
continuous cultivation of existing cropland (higher ‘‘cropping
intensities’’) and shifts to relatively high-value crops. Fertilizer
use intensity has risen much more slowly, and the efﬁciency of fer-
tilizer use in raising output per unit of land is signiﬁcantly lower
than in Asia (Headey and Jayne, 2014). The difference in irrigation
investments between Africa and Asia is even more stark, with only
a small fraction of Africa being irrigated (Headey and Jayne, 2014).
The second qualiﬁcation to the Boserupian intensiﬁcation con-
cept concerns what happens at relatively high levels of population
density. Consistent with Boserup, we see a positive relationship
between population density and measures of land intensiﬁcation
– up to a point. Several studies in this issue ﬁnd that beyond 500
persons per km2, measures of land productivity and intensiﬁcation
plateau and then decline after roughly 600 persons per square kilo-
meter.12 This ﬁnding requires additional scrutiny, but may be
related to several factors.
As population pressures cause a gradual shrinking of farm sizes
over time, smallholder farmers respond bymore continuously crop-
ping their ﬁelds every year. Fallowshave largely disappeared in den-
sely populated areas.13 More continuous cultivation of existing plots
would not necessarily pose problems to sustainable intensiﬁcation if
soil quality weremaintained or improved over time, e.g. through ade-
quate soil amendment practices, use of fertilizers and other inputs.
However, amajor body of evidence in Africa points to soil degradation
arising from unsustainable cultivation practices in high-density areas
of the continent (e.g., Stoorvogel and Smaling, 1990; Drechsel et al.,
2001; Tittonell and Giller, 2013).14 Nitrogen is one of themajor nutri-
ents being mined from African soils and sufﬁcient quantities of inor-12 These ﬁndings are upheld by both unconditional bivariate relationships as well as
in econometric work which controls for household and community-speciﬁc charac-
teristics. For evidence in Malawi, Kenya and Ethiopia, see Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2014;
Muyanga and Jayne, 2014; and Josephson et al., 2014.
13 Fuglie and Rada (2013) reports that fallowed land as a proportion of total
farmland in sub-Saharan Africa has declined from 40% in 1960 to roughly 15% in 2011.
Survey data used for analysis in the Malawi, Ethiopia and Kenya studies in this issue
show that less than 5% of landholdings in the villages with over 250 persons per km2
are under fallow.
14 An important contrasting study by Tiffen et al. (1994) argues that population
pressures between 1950 and 1980 in the Machakos District of Kenya induced
households to make land-augmenting investments that contributed to sustainable
intensiﬁcation. However, in a more recent revisit to these same areas in 2014, Kyalo
and Muyanga (2014) note that population densities during the period studied by
Tiffen et al., were generally below 400 persons per km2, that densities of some
divisions have risen well over 800 km2, and that there is widespread evidence of soil
degradation and unsustainable forms of intensiﬁcation.ganic fertilizer can address this constraint. However, there are many
aspects of soil quality that cannot be addressed by conventional inor-
ganic fertilizers. These ‘‘non-nitrogen’’ constraints on soil quality tend
to depress the efﬁciency of inorganic fertilizer in contributing to crop
output (Shaxson and Barber, 2003; Pieri, 1989) and thereby depress
the effective demand for inorganic fertilizer. Someof these constraints
are related to current forms of continuous cultivation.
The ﬁrst of these non-nitrogen soil quality elements is soil acid-
ity. Acidic soils lock up phosphorus in the soil and prevent it from
being available to the plant, thereby depressing crop response to
nitrogen application (Burke, 2013; Obura et al., 2010). Soil acidiﬁ-
cation is exacerbated by extensive use of inorganic fertilizers with-
out concurrent steps being taken to raise soil pH. Micronutrient
deﬁciencies constitute a second yield-inhibiting category of soil
degradation that can only be ameliorated if greater efforts are
made to blend inorganic fertilizers to suit a greater diversity of
local conditions and needs. Third, and perhaps most importantly
in densely populated areas, soil organic carbon levels have reached
very low levels in high-density Africa (Powlson et al., 2011;
Vanlauwe et al., 2011). Nitrogen use efﬁciency on cereals tends
to be strongly inversely related to soil organic carbon (Marenya
and Barrett, 2009; Vanlauwe et al., 2011). Loss of active carbon
in soils is a leading explanation for why farmers in many areas
complain of having to apply greater doses of nitrogen-based fertil-
izer in order to maintain their yields over time (Sileshi et al., 2011).
Most production systems in high-density Africa are so heavily pri-
oritized to meeting the next year’s staple food needs that crop rota-
tions and the use of cover crops or intercrops to raise soil carbon
levels are difﬁcult to adopt. On very small farms, households can-
not afford to sacriﬁce a whole year by planting green manures or
crops for which there is limited consumption value because they
need to produce as much food as possible for the coming year.
For these reasons, many existing production systems lack access
to sufﬁcient organic matter to enable recycling of crop residues
to restore favorable soil carbon levels, especially where zero-graze
livestock has not taken hold. Many households therefore continue
to grow staple crops on the same ﬁelds year after year, continuing
to obtain very low efﬁciency of inorganic fertilizer application,
effectively mining their soils of a range of nutrients and depressing
their potential to be productive in future years.
Giller et al. (2006) and Tittonell et al. (2007) conclude that
smallholder farmers are largely unable to beneﬁt from the current
yield gains offered by plant genetic improvement due to their
farming on depleted soils that are non-responsive to fertilizer
application. Tittonell and Giller (2013) recommend thinking about
sustainable intensiﬁcation efforts in terms of three categories of
ﬁelds: those which are (i) responsive to fertilizer use; (ii) non-
responsive but still productive; and (iii) non-responsive and
degraded. The third category of ﬁelds will require rehabilitation
of several years before yields can be improved (Vanlauwe et al.,
2011). Rising population pressures and more continuous cropping
Fig. 1. Rural population trends (millions) in Africa and other developing areas.
Source: UN 2013b.
Fig. 2. Age pyramid for rural SSA, 2015. Source: United Nations, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Urban and Rural Population by
Age and Sex, 1980–2015 (version 2, August 2013). Available at: https://www.un.
org/en/development/desa/population/publications/dataset/urban/urbanAndRural
PopulationByAgeAndSex.shtml.
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from category (i) to categories (ii) and (iii), where yields are less
responsive to fertilizer application. This has enormous conse-
quences for policies designed to enhance productivity in a region
increasingly dominated by smallholder production in high-density
environments.
This narrative of soil quality decline in farming systems in high-
density Africa is our leading hypothesis for why the studies in this
volume consistently found a leveling-off of land productivity and
intensiﬁcation beyond a threshold level of population density. A
low degree of irrigation and other forms of water control also
appear to constrain intensiﬁcation. If upheld by future research,
this ﬁnding would require a major qualiﬁcation to the Boserupian
intensiﬁcation narrative and a consequent rethinking of conven-
tional approaches to sustainable agricultural productivity growth.
There is increasing recognition that raising organic matter, mois-
ture retention, and other forms of soil rehabilitation in addition
to greater inorganic fertilizer use are preconditions for sustainable
agricultural productivity growth in densely populated rainfed
farming systems of Africa (Powlson et al., 2011; Snapp et al.,
2010; Tittonell and Giller, 2013).15 This skill set includes skills in using improved technologies (e.g., herbicides,
conservation farming practices, use of cell phones for accessing soil testing services,
market information and ﬁnance), accounting skills, navigating state and private sector
institutions for accessing services such as ﬁnance, extension support, veterinary
services, and marketing support.Shifting labor to rural non-farm activities
Rural households may also respond to rising labor/land ratios by
shifting labor to non-farm activities. Althoughmuch has beenmade
in recent years of the growth in the rural non-farm economy (RNFE),
the nature of this sector and its impact on poverty is still the subject
of some uncertainty (Haggblade et al., 2010). Haggblade (2005)
describes two stylizedmovements into the RNFE: one characterized
by ‘‘pull’’ factors, in which rising farm productivity and farm
incomes stimulate a diverse and vibrant non-farm sector, attracting
labor from agriculture through enhanced income andwelfare gains,
and anothermovement dominated by ‘‘push’’ factors in which ‘‘fall-
ing agricultural labor productivity, low opportunity cost of labor,
and declining household purchasing power induce diversiﬁcation
into low-return, labor-intensive nonfarm activities such as basket
making, gathering, pottery, weaving, embroidery or mat making’’
(p5). Such a process of ‘‘agricultural involution’’ is characterized as
a ‘‘bleak, downward spiral’’ (Geertz, 1963).
The picture remains unclear about which of these stylized pic-
tures best characterizes RNFE growth in different settings within
the region. However, examination of the speciﬁc non-farm activi-
ties and their income shares from rural survey data generally cor-
roborates the notion that push factors are signiﬁcant (e.g., Ricker-
Gilbert et al., 2014). Off-farm income shares are in the range of 20–
40% and slightly higher for households with the smallest farms. A
high proportion of off-farm income features low entry-barrier,
low-return informal employment, raising concerns of unskilled
rural labor being pushed out of agriculture rather than being pulledinto productive non-farm jobs (Haggblade, 2005; World Bank,
2007).
With regard to the question as to whether rural households
respond to population density by diversifying into off-farm
employment, Appendix Table A2 presents estimation results for
the determinants of rural household off-farm income, based on
four countries for which survey data was available (Kenya, Malawi,
Zambia, and Mozambique, representing a pair of high-density and
low-density countries, respectively). While the association
between local population density and off-farm income levels is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant in two cases, the elasticities are small in all
cases, indicating that rural non-farm income shares are only mar-
ginally sensitive to population density. Other factors, such as fam-
ily size, farm size, and proximity to towns and markets had
considerably greater power in explaining the variability of non-
farm incomes across households. Headey and Jayne’s cross-country
analysis (this issue) also ﬁnds no systematic response of rural non-
farm employment shares to higher population density. Instead
they ﬁnd stronger associations with agricultural productivity, edu-
cation and infrastructure.
Liu and Yamauchi’s study of rural Indonesia (2014) also exam-
ines these different drivers of nonfarm diversiﬁcation, particularly
education. Poor people possess two major assets: their land and
their labor. As land assets diminish, it becomes increasingly impor-
tant to bolster the labor assets of the poor (i.e., the returns to labor)
through human capital, infrastructure and other non-farm job cre-
ating investments. Liu and Yamauchi show that rural households
containing more educated members were able to achieve much
higher levels of consumption expenditure and were not adversely
affected by small farm sizes, in contrast to more poorly educated
households. These ﬁndings all point to the importance of support-
ing rural households’ efforts to educate their children so that the
region’s future labor force will better compete for good jobs in
the local and global economy.
The need for skill training also applies to farming, though the
skill set required for successful farming is rapidly evolving.15 Given
these realities, Africa’s young rural people entering the labor force
will need to be equipped with the skills needed for them to make
viable and meaningful livelihoods from farming. This has major
implications for the future development of the region’s educational
systems. Successful entrepreneurs in farming will increasingly
require access to skilled agricultural and marketing extension
Fig. 3. Conceptual framework for examining the determinants of and responses to land scarcity.
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only be as good as the local agricultural and vocational colleges that
train them. Anticipating the nature of these shifts and supporting
educational supply chains to provide them is a huge challenge.
Rural–rural migration
The classic Harris and Todaro (1970) and Tiebout (1956) models
of migration and their extensions offer important theoretical per-
spectives on rural–rural migration.16 In the Harris-Todaro model
migration is a function of the relative expected returns to labor in
the source and potential destination areas, inﬂuenced by relative
land/labor ratios, agroecological potential, and market access condi-
tions. In the Tiebout model migration is also a function of public ser-
vices (health, education, transport), and in an extension to African
settings, the degree to which local institutions in the destination
area are hospitable to settlement by migrants (Hsiang, 2013).
Data on rural-to-rural migration is surprisingly thin, and consti-
tutes an important research gap. Migration ﬂows can tell us a great
deal because they reﬂect dynamic changes in economic opportuni-
ties (Potts, 2013). The few available African studies show rural-
rural migration ﬂows to be substantial and greater than rural–
urban migration in some cases (Bilsborrow, 2002). Survey data
consistently show a high degree of rural labor mobility and reloca-
tion. For example, Beegle et al.’s (2011) study of household mobil-
ity in Kagera, Tanzania, indicates that about half of surveyed
individuals moved from their home village within a single decade
(about half of which moved to other rural areas). The search for
more land, better land, and jobs appears to drive rural-rural migra-
tion, with outﬂows frommore densely populated areas and inﬂows
to relatively sparsely populated areas.17 Rural labor mobility in SSA
is believed to be highly sensitive to the functioning of land and labor
markets, as well as government land policies and customary institu-
tions; though again, there is a paucity of evidence on the subject.
Despite evidence of signiﬁcant rural mobility in much of Africa,
the equilibration of land-labor ratios over space appears to be
occurring at a very slow pace given the high levels of spatial clus-
tering that we observe at present. Slow equilibration of land/labor
ratios over space may suggest institutional factors impeding the16 The Harris-Todaro model was originally applied to understand rural–urban
migration, but its basic premise that labor ﬂows are inﬂuenced by expected returns to
labor in the source and potential destination areas apply to rural–rural migration as
well.
17 Jayne and Muyanga (2012) found that the net outﬂow of adult labor in Kenya is
four times higher from the top 20% of villages ranked by population density than from
the bottom 20% of villages.free ﬂow of labor into other areas, which could be interpreted as
signs of land or labor market failures, or alternatively as means
to protect the rights of indigenous communities.18 Several articles
in this issue summarize the reasons inhibiting the rise of land mar-
kets (Holden and Otsuka, 2014; Deininger et al., 2014, 2011). Among
the most prominent are that: (i) customary land tenure institutions
are purposefully designed to inhibit the introduction of land trans-
ferability to ensure access to land for local people; and (ii) land is
the principal de facto source of local power of chiefs and other tradi-
tional authorities, and as such, they tend to resist the introduction of
market-based land transfers. Nonetheless, where land is abundant,
inﬂows by outsider groups may not be uncommon (e.g., Mutabazi
et al., 2010).
Rural–urban migration
Much of Africa’s economic situation in the next several decades
will depend on the pace of growth in non-farm sectors. Rapid non-
farm employment growth would relieve land pressures by pulling
rural labor out of agriculture. As mentioned in Section 2, Africa has
a unique age demographic in which over 60% of its rural people are
under 25 years of age. Roughly 21 million people will enter the
labor force each year over the next decade, with at least half of
them originating from rural areas. The ‘‘youth bulge’’ will put
immense pressure on both agriculture and non-farm sectors to
generate enough jobs to absorb this burgeoning labor force.
Land scarcity may inﬂuence the difference between the
expected returns to labor in agriculture versus migrating to seek
employment in urban areas (Todaro, 1970; Bilsborrow, 2002).
Rural–urban migration would not necessarily be a problem if the
region’s urban economies were growing quickly enough to absorb
the rapidly growing labor force into productive jobs. Recent analy-
ses differ tremendously on this question. Some analyses see evi-
dence of remarkable economic growth and the rise of an African
middle class, while others see relatively fewer signs of broad-based
changes.
For example, a relatively bullish study by Fine et al. (2012)
points to rapid non-farm and mainly urban job growth potential,
but also indicates that the labor force is growing faster than that18 In response to perceived constraints on movement from land constrained to land
abundant areas, some countries (e.g. Ethiopia, Zimbabwe) have signiﬁcantly engi-
neered such ﬂows, either directly or indirectly, through governmental resettlement
programs and policies (e.g., Chambers, 1969, Adepoju, 1982; Maro and Mlay, 1982;
Kinsey and Binswanger, 1993). The success of such schemes, however, has been
decidedly mixed, highlighting the fact that the barriers to land-labor equilibration are
complex and not always obvious.
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world where urbanization has been associated with domestic agri-
cultural productivity growth and industrialization, urbanization in
most of Africa has been driven by primary product exports with
limited impact on employment growth (Fox, 2012; Gollin et al.,
2013; Potts, 2013; Glaeser, 2013).19 No country in SSA has a manu-
facturing sector that accounts for more than 10% of GDP.
While some sources point to a rising middle class in Africa (e.g.,
African Development Bank, 2011; Tschirley et al., 2013), these con-
clusions are highly sensitive to how ‘‘middle class’’ is deﬁned.20
Ravallion et al. (2007) show that headcount poverty rates in sub-
Saharan Africa fell slightly in rural areas between the early 1990s
and early 2000s, but rose slightly in urban areas. Africa’s urban pop-
ulation is clearly very poor by global standards. UN-Habitat esti-
mates that around 62% of Africa’s urban population lives in slums,
and show that slum-dwellers in Kenya do not see their relative
incomes increase over time, suggesting slum-based poverty traps
(United Nations, 2010). Other studies are more skeptical that Africa’s
urban population is really growing quickly (Potts, 2012, 2013; Gollin
et al., 2013). Several studies argue that the UN’s model-based esti-
mates of rapid urbanization in Africa are based on thin empirical evi-
dence (Bocquier, 2005; Potts, 2012), and that in several instances
urbanization has been much slower than the UN models predict.
Why is urbanization in Africa not systematically contributing
more to poverty reduction in high density Africa? One explanation
of this phenomenon is offered above in the context of ‘‘push migra-
tion’’ in the rural nonfarm sector: when farm sizes are shrinking
without appreciable growth in output per hectare, then rural labor
(the young, in particular) are driven to urban areas, where
unskilled wages adjust downwards in response to this inﬂux. Other
factors constant, this process would slow down the rate of rural–
urban migration, and keep more people at last partially dependent
on farming.
Upward shifts in the demand for labor could work in the oppo-
site direction. In theory, relatively low wages could attract invest-
ment in manufacturing, as has been the case in much of Asia.
Supportive industrial, infrastructure, and skill training policies to
attract both local and foreign investment capital in labor-intensive
manufacturing and industry would offer the greatest prospects for
non-farm job creation and urban income growth, which would in
turn relieve land pressures in rural areas, and raise the returns to
labor in family farming in a virtuous cycle.
Another explanation for the observed urbanization without eco-
nomic growth and poverty reduction centers on the composition of
the urban non-farm sector (e.g. Gollin et al., 2013). This explana-
tion follows from the argument that the tradable manufacturing
sector is capable of higher labor productivity growth than non-
tradable services (Timmer & Vries, 2007; Rodrik, 2011), along with
the already-mentioned observation that most African urban econ-
omies are heavily based around non-tradable services, rather than
manufacturing and other tradables. Thus, given the economic
structure of Africa’s urban growth (in which such ‘‘consumption
cities’’ predominate), Africa experiences lower rates of labor19 Most natural resource industries employ less than 1% of Africa’s work force.
Mining and quarrying accounted for 0.9% of Africa’s urban workforce in 2000. While
the share of Angola’s urban population rose from 15% in the 1970s to 58% in 2010
thanks in part to crude oil, which accounts for 62% of GDP, oil employs fewer than
10,000 nationals (Jedwab, 2013).
20 The AfDB deﬁned middle class as per capita daily consumption of $2–$20 in 2005
PPP US dollars, and found that this group has risen from 27% to 34% of the population
between 1990 and 2010. However, about 60% of the middle class in 2010 were in the
$2–$4 per capita consumption group, barely out of the poor category and in constant
threat of falling back into it (AfDB 2011). If this group is excluded, the rise in Africa’s
middle class would over the past two decades would be quite modest. However, there
is some evidence of rising incomes among a small segment at the top end of the
income distribution.productivity growth than would otherwise be expected (e.g.
following the Asian pattern).Fertility changes
In addition to migration, another potentially important demo-
graphic response to rising land constraints is the reduction of fer-
tility rates. Debates over the extent to which fertility is a choice
variable go back as far as Malthus (1798). In his original treatise
Malthus assumed that population growth would be inexorable,
even in the face of the cyclical booms and busts in food production
that his model predicted. Subsequent scholarship on the subject
has tended to conceptualize fertility as a choice variable, i.e. fertil-
ity outcomes are at least potentially reactive to household resource
constraints and opportunity costs (Becker and Lewis, 1973; De
Tray, 1973). A sizeable economics literature has explored some of
the key economic drivers of fertility reduction, such as increased
female labor force participation, female education, and increases
in household wealth (see Schultz, 1997 for a review). In contrast
the demographic literature on this subject points more to inade-
quate supply of family planning technologies, though this litera-
ture acknowledges the importance of economic factors as well
(Kohler, 2012). Though the efﬁcacy of family planning interven-
tions remains controversial (following Pritchett, 1994, in particu-
lar), there is evidence that these interventions played an
important role in reducing fertility rates in a number of Asian
countries, which in turn created a demographic dividend involving
higher savings and investment, and faster economic growth
(Bloom et al., 1999).
In the context of rising rural labor-land ratios, however,
Bilsborrow (1987) is one of the few authors to consider the possi-
bility that rural households reduce fertility rates in response to
land constraints, although there is little prior research directly
testing this hypothesis. Headey and Jayne (2014) conduct cross-
country tests of whether rural fertility rates respond to land
constraints, as measured by rural population density. They ﬁnd
that while realized fertility rates are largely unresponsive to higher
population density, the fertility rates desired by African women
declines sharply and signiﬁcantly as population density increases.
Controlling for agricultural income and female education, they ﬁnd
that women in a high density country like Rwanda (with a popula-
tion density of 420 people per km2) desire about 1.5 fewer children
than a low density country Tanzania (with a population density of
90 people per km2). These are large differences in desired fertility
rates which, if achieved, would have sizeable impacts on long term
population growth. It also suggests an ‘‘unmet demand for
contraception’’, though critiques of this concept by Pritchett
(1994) warrants caution about relying solely on family planning
interventions to close this gap. A big push on female education
and empowerment, for example, might also contribute to lower
fertility and simultaneously produce other important social and
productivity-related goals. Another point of note is that while
investments in reducing fertility rates will obviously not ease
land pressures in the short term, they have the potential to make
a large difference in reducing land pressures over the next 20 to
50 years.Updating the rural landscape: new actors and changing
institutions
The rush for African land by foreign investors in the wake of the
2008 food price spike has drawn considerable attention to the
availability of land for African agriculture (e.g., Schoneveld
(2014)). Recent global policy attention to ‘‘land grabs’’ by interna-
tional investors, while important, has arguably diverted attention
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affecting Africa’s economic development trajectory: the pace of
land acquisitions by medium-scale African investors, and the over-
all impact of land transactions on the viability of African govern-
ments’ agricultural development plans, which implicitly assume
the potential for smallholder area expansion. This section
addresses these issues within the context of the region’s rapidly
changing dynamics of land allocation and farm structure. We high-
light three features: (i) the pace of large-scale foreign acquisitions
in Africa; (ii) the rise of medium-scale farmers and investors and
their characteristics; and (iii) the associated transfer of lands from
customary tenure to state titled land.Large-scale acquisitions account for a signiﬁcant portion of Africa’s
remaining arable land
The comprehensive study by Schoneveld (2014) estimates that
22.7 million hectares of arable land in sub-Saharan Africa has been
acquired by large-scale entities, with roughly 90% of this involving
a foreign primary shareholder. According to our analysis, this is
equivalent to roughly 9.7% of total area under cultivation in sub-
Saharan Africa, and 15–35% of the region’s remaining potentially
available cropland (PAC) if forestland is excluded, and somewhat
less if forestland is included in PAC (Chamberlin et al., 2014). Strik-
ingly, though, around half of these investments are located in just
six countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, South
Sudan, and Zambia. Notably, the list does not include the DRC or
other Central African countries with sizeable land, water and forest
resources. Another important feature of these investments is that
only 7% of them pertain to basic food crops. Instead, these invest-
ments are heavily geared towards oilseeds (60%), timber and pulp-
wood trees (15%) and sugar crops (13%) (Schoneveld, 2014).21 Electronic mail from K. Stambuli to Professor Michael Weber, Michigan State
University, February 13, 2003, subject: ‘‘Elitist Land and Agricultural Policies’’: I have
seriously deplored the social injustice and economic marginalization associated with land
conversion from communal tenure to leasehold tenure mostly enjoyed by the elite who
also enjoyed a monopoly in the production of export crops. Most deplorable is the fact that
the abundance of idle land among estates explains much of the low equilibrium trap to
which our countries have been subjected. The economic hegemony of the agricultural elite
was compounded by state enterprise expansion into the private sector, over-regulation, a
stiﬂing bureaucracy, and totalitarian politics. Inadequate amounts of land available to
farmers remain a major constraint to supply response.The rise of medium-scale farmers
The most revolutionary change in farm structure has been
among medium-scale holdings. In spite of the international med-
ia’s focus on land grabs by foreign investors, a recent study of
Ghana, Kenya and Zambia indicate that in all three countries the
land controlled by medium-scale farms now exceeds that of for-
eign and domestic large-scale holdings combined (Jayne et al.,
2014). Moreover, holdings between 5 and 100 ha now account
for more land than small-scale farms (0–5 ha) in two of the three
countries examined (Ghana and Zambia).
There is a strong inverse correlation between landholding size
and the proportion of landholdings under cultivation (e.g., see
Table 4 for Zambia). The fact that almost 90% of the land owned
by Zambian farms in the 20 to 100 hectare landholding category
remains uncultivated may explain the paradoxical appearance of
land abundance in a country where most small-scale farmers com-
plain of an inability to acquire more land for themselves (e.g., Jayne
et al., 2008). In Ghana, by contrast, medium-scale farms cultivate
roughly half of the land under their control and are contributing
substantially to food production growth in the country (Chapoto
et al., 2013). The overall impact of medium-scale farms may there-
fore vary substantially across countries and is an important topic
for further study.
The rapid rise of medium-scale farms has led to a concentration
of landholdings. In the study of Ghana, Kenya and Zambia by Jayne
et al. (2014), the Gini coefﬁcients of landholdings rose in all three
countries substantially, e.g., in Ghana from 0.52 in 1992 to 0.65 in
2005. While landholdings in most of Africa are not as concentrated
as in Latin America, where Gini coefﬁcients can be as high as 0.90,
the Ginis in the three African case studies are substantially higher
than most Asian countries. Clearly, the idea of a unimodal andegalitarian farm structure within Africa’s indigenous farming
population has become outdated.
Disturbingly, national survey data on landholdings may obscure
land acquisitions of very large sizes by private individuals.
Namwaya (2004) reports that over 600,000 ha of land, or roughly
one-sixth of Kenya’s total land area, are held by the families of
the country’s three former presidents, and that most of this land
is in relatively high-potential areas. Evidence of this is not apparent
in ofﬁcial nationally representative survey data. Shortly before his
assassination in 2003, the Economic Advisor to the President of
Malawi, Kalonga Stambuli, wrote that the concentration of land
among a small domestic elite was a central explanation of the
country’s poverty trap.21 Woodhouse (2003), Flintan (2011) and
others also write of the growing enclosure movement in Africa,
which may result in hidden land shortages in countries that might
appear to be low-density.
Who are these new entrants to the sector? Life history surveys
of medium-scale farmers reveal that they are predominantly men;
their primary jobs were in the non-farm sector, the majority of
these being in government (Sitko and Jayne, 2014; see also Jayne
et al., 2014). Many of these farmers live in urban areas. They are
relatively well educated. The majority in Zambia acquired their
farms after the age of forty. Using their savings from their non-
farm jobs, they were able to acquire farms and enter farming dur-
ing their mid-life stages. This proﬁle ﬁts roughly 60% of the sam-
pled medium-scale farmers in Kenya and 58% in Zambia. A
smaller but still important category of medium-scale farmer is rel-
atively privileged rural-born men who were able to acquire large
landholdings as they started out their careers. Only in Ghana was
it found that signiﬁcant proportion of medium-scale farmers
started out with less than ﬁve hectares of land. The Ghana ﬁndings
provide at least some room for optimism that small-scale farmers
can expand into commercialized medium-scale stature under
favorable land access conditions.
The combination of ‘‘concentrated land abundance’’ with weak
governance raises some complex tradeoffs. Where land is scarce,
land concentration among domestic or foreign investors hardly
seems a pro-poor development path for countries in which poor
rural people have limited alternatives to farming for their liveli-
hoods. For land abundant countries, the picture is more complex.
As Mellor (2014) discusses, there is still a strong poverty reduction
argument for investing in small commercial farmers rather than
large-scale models. Much of Africa’s remaining unutilized land is
in tropical lowland areas that are well suited to non-food cash
crops, such as palm oil and rubber. Byerlee’s (2014) review of oil
palm and rubber in tropical Asia concludes that where the state
has actively supported smallholders, such as for rubber in Thailand
and Malaysia, and tea in Sri Lanka, smallholders are overwhelm-
ingly dominant and have taken over the industry from plantations.
However, where the state is weak or is biased toward large-scale
enterprises, producers are much more heterogeneous with the
growing role of medium- and large-scale producers. Policy deci-
sions obviously have a major inﬂuence on farm structure, which
then affects employment patterns and the inclusivity of agricul-
tural growth.
Table 4
Changes in farm structure among small- and medium-scale farmers in Zambia.
Landholding size category Number of farms % Change (2001–2012) % of total farmland Share of landholding cultivated (2012) (%)
2001a 2009 2012 2009 2012
0–2 ha 638,118 916,787 748,771 17.3 24.1 16.2 91.2
2–5 ha 159,039 366,628 418,544 163.2 33.8 31.7 66.4
5–10 ha 20,832 110,436 165,129 692.6 20.3 25.0 49.5
10–20 ha 2352 35,898 53,454 2272.7 12.3 15.0 36.7
20–100 ha – 9,030 13,839 53.3b 9.5 12.0 10.9
Total 820,341 1,438,779 1,399,737 70.6 100.0 100.0
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock and Central Statistical Ofﬁce Crop Forecast Surveys.
a 2001 Figures are land under cultivation.
b Computed from 2009 to 2012 only.
22 While Jin and Jayne (2013) found that households leasing land in Kenya were able
to increase their net farm (net total) incomes by 25.1 (6.6)%, these percentage
increases in the incomes of renters are often not large in absolute terms, and hence
participation in rental markets alone is not sufﬁcient to meaningfully affect rural
poverty rates.
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In the past several decades, and especially since the rise of
world food prices in 2008, there have been concerted efforts to
transfer land out of customary tenure (under the control of tradi-
tional authorities) to the state or to private individuals who, it is
argued, can more effectively exploit the productive potential of
the land to meet national food security objectives. For example,
the quantity of recorded new land titles in Zambia over 10 ha since
1995 amounts to 12% of the land cultivated nationally, with the
mean title deed size being roughly 52 ha (Sitko and Jayne, 2014).
New titles connote the acquisition of land from customary author-
ities and conversion to newly privatized land owned by the title
holder. This process is increasing the supply of titled land that
can be bought and sold by individuals, hence contributing to the
development of land markets.
However, the distributional effects of converting land from cus-
tomary to state titled land continue to be contested (Holden and
Otsuka, 2014). The conversion of land from customary to state ten-
ure generally reﬂects the ceding of power and authority from tradi-
tional authorities to the functioning of landmarkets, and ultimately
to the state (Herbst, 2000), since the rules and institutions of allmar-
kets are determined by the state. The nature of agricultural develop-
ment will also be inﬂuenced by the extent to which unutilized land
remains under the allocative control of chiefs or the state. Although
traditional institutional norms are increasingly vulnerable to cor-
ruption as the value of land rises, land under customary tenure is
designed to provide free ‘‘birthright access’’ to land by smallholder
farmers in the community and generally does so where the tradi-
tional authorities still have land left to allocate (Cotula, 2007). By
contrast, land transferred from customary to state tenure provides
‘‘bonanza’’ discount purchases to the ﬁrst buyer, generally privi-
leged people, and then afterward is bought and sold based on
willingness and ability to pay. Land under this tenure structure
almost never goes to poor smallholder farmers. Tenure structure –
an outcome of the struggles between traditional authorities and
the modern state – therefore has major implications for whether
the region’s remaining unutilized cropland is allocated to members
of rural communities (favoring a smallholder development
pathway) or according to market transactions (favoring medium
and large-scale investors) (e.g., Cotula, 2007).
Tenure changes are linked with changes in land markets. Theo-
retically, enhanced tenure security (brought about by titling or
other means) is an important enabler of land sales and rental mar-
kets and associated productivity gains (Holden and Otsuka, 2014;
Fenske, 2011). Empirically, land titling and the development of
land markets are more pronounced in areas with better access to
markets, services and infrastructure – which tend to be the areas
with the highest rural population densities (ibid). While there is
some evidence that land markets (especially rental markets) sup-
port equity outcomes, this is not a foregone conclusion (Colinand Woodhouse, 2010; Holden et al., 2009). Distress sales may
exacerbate distributional inequalities (Deininger et al., 2014,
2011). Furthermore, if title conversion mechanisms are fronts for
relatively afﬂuent domestic and international investors to obtain
land relatively cheaply, then the rise of these institutions may be
exacerbating land pressures in high-density areas by restricting
the supply of unutilized land that would otherwise support volun-
tary rural-rural migration.
Land rental markets are developing rapidly in the more den-
sely-populated areas (Woodhouse, 2003; Holden et al., 2009). Land
rental markets generally improve both efﬁciency and equity by
transferring land from less productive users with relatively large
landholdings to more efﬁcient and land-constrained farmers
(Migot-Adholla et al., 1994; Pender and Fafchamps, 2006; Otsuka,
2007). The rise of land rental markets may also help the growing
rural labor force access land, but because renting land generally
involves providing the equivalent of one-third or more of the crop
proceeds to the landlord (Jin and Jayne, 2013; Holden et al., 2009),
tenants must be extremely productive to make a reasonable liveli-
hood by renting land.22
Are the region’s governments able to harness the rising demand
for land and water for promoting national developmental objec-
tives? Deininger et al. (2014, 2011) document the problems of land
governance of large-scale land acquisitions by applying their Land
Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF) to seven African coun-
tries and three non-African countries for comparison. The LGAF
module on this component comprises 16 different dimensions of
the governance of these acquisitions. We tally up the country
scores for these dimensions and scale them between zero and
100 to provide a broad comparison across countries (Fig. 4). Strik-
ingly, many of the African countries surveyed score very poorly,
even those otherwise thought of as having relatively good gover-
nance, such as Ghana. The LGAF provides a practical framework
for improving land governance, but it also shows that a great deal
of work is needed to improve both legal protection, policy design
and policy implementation of land governance in Africa.Conclusions and implications
This article synthesizes emerging research on rural land access
in Africa and considers its implications for development policy.
Evidence indicates that access constraints are increasingly important
for the region’s smallholders, even outside of the obvious hotspots,
and that such constraints are increasing over time as the amount of
land under customary tenure declines while populations within
Fig. 4. Land Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF) scores for large scale land
acquisitions. Source: Author’s calculations from Table 9 of Deininger et al. (2014).
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erogeneity in the region’s spatial continuum of land pressures,
many of the region’s most populous countries will soon exhaust
their land frontiers (e.g. Uganda, Nigeria, highland Ethiopia), and
others have largely exhausted it already (e.g. Kenya, Rwanda, Bur-
undi, Malawi). This means that agricultural development strategies
that tacitly or explicitly expect production growth to come from
area expansion will be increasingly untenable in many areas.
The much ballyhooed urbanization of Africa does not mean that
agriculture will decline in importance as a source of livelihood for
many if notmost of sub-Saharan Africa’s population. Recent surveys
show that a high proportion of urban households still depend on
farming for some of their livelihood, and there is pervasive circular
migration of urbanites to rural areas during the crop growing season
togenerate incomeand reducedependenceon themarket for food.23
Moreover, the jump inworld food prices since 2008 hasmade farming
very proﬁtable for those with sufﬁcient capital to acquire good agri-
cultural land and use modern inputs. Wealthy urbanites are increas-
ingly investing in land for both speculative reasons and for income
generation through farming. Thedemand for cropland, being aderived
demand for food, is rising rapidly especially as the region has transi-
tioned almost fully to import parity price levels for both grain and ani-
mal products. Some croplandwill be lost over time as small hinterland
towns grow into cities and attract new investment for non-farm pur-
poses in surrounding lands. Hence the urbanization of Africa will
simultaneously reduce the supply of arable land by converting it to
urban and industrial areas and raise the demand for agricultural land.
For both reasons, as long as long-term real world food prices do not
decline, the price of land in much of Africa over the next several dec-
ades is likely to increase substantially.
In areas where the localized land frontier has been exhausted,
most rural young people entering the labor force will have less
access to less land than their parents due to subdivision among sib-
lings. We anticipate that intensifying land scarcity will increase
rural-rural migration to areas where land is still available and will
put greater pressure on non-farm sectors to absorb rural labor in
densely populated areas. Recalling the four possible means of cop-
ing with rising land scarcity, we reach the following conclusions on
the policy challenges going forward.
Land intensiﬁcation remains an important pathway, but sustain-
able intensiﬁcation may not occur without more holistic and more
effective public support for smallholder agriculture. The large gap
between observed and potential crop productivity, even when rec-
ommended rates of inorganic fertilizer are used, reﬂect constraints
related to soil fertility and moisture. Limited crop responsiveness
to conventional inorganic fertilizers on degraded soils indicates
the need for a more holistic approach to sustainable intensiﬁcation
in densely populated areas – ironically, in the very areas where
land productivity improvements are most expected according to
the Boserupian framework and where they are most required for
sustainable rural livelihoods.
A shift in labor from farm production to rural non-farm employ-
ment holds some promise but is currently constrained by the lack
of broad-based income growth in rural areas that would support
the rise of rural non-farm employment. Investments in physical
infrastructure and supporting services may help, as will invest-
ments in human capital development, but ultimately a farm struc-
ture that is egalitarian enough to support broad based income
growth from agriculture is decisive, especially given the thus far
stunted growth of African manufacturing.23 For example, Hichaambwa et al. (2009) show that more than half of the
households residing in four cities in Zambia grow food crops, with the largest share of
their cultivated area being in rural areas and accounting for just under 10% of the area
cultivated nationally. See also Zezza and Tasciotti (2010) for a cross-country
assessment.Economically rewarding relocation to urban areas is obviously
desirable but constrained by the rate of growth in remunerative
urban non-farm jobs. The ability to absorb workers with limited
skills andabilitieswill be particularly challenging. Themost effective
long-term strategy will involve upgrading the educational system
(including universities, vocational schools and agricultural colleges)
to provide the skills required by a competitive twenty-ﬁrst century
work force – recognizing that the quality of the work force depends
on the quality of local educational systems – as well as an industrial
policy that attracts new investment and employment opportunities.
Migration to the more land abundant rural areas may be greatly
facilitated by targeted investments that ‘‘open up’’ such regions
(in countries where they still exist). Lack of transport infrastruc-
ture, in particular, is often a binding constraint (Chamberlin
et al., 2014), but so too is the inadequate provision of health and
other services for more remote areas. More generally it is still
unclear what the right balance is between smallholder and large
farm expansion in low density areas. This would be a fruitful area
for future research.
Promoting (and responding to) household demand for fertility con-
trol may be targeted by policies and investments in family plan-
ning, education and health systems. Naturally, such investments
may have long lag periods before their effects are felt, but may
pay large dividends in the long run. Moreover, the unmet demand
for contraception in land constrained countries suggests that these
kinds of interventions could be very effective in these contexts
(Headey and Jayne, 2014).
In thinking about these ﬁve responses to rising land constraints,
it is clear that all ﬁve responses are feasiblewith supportive policies,
though the relative importance of themwill vary according to coun-
tries’ endowments and conditions. Indeed, our perception of Asia’s
experience is that the more successful countries in that region
increased yields (particularly of rice andwheat), expanded land area
for rural-ruralmigration (particularly Indonesia, Malaysia and Thai-
land), experienced a relatively successful industry-led urbanization
path (with human capital accumulation playing a signiﬁcant role),
and very actively sought to reduce fertility rates through family
planning and investments in women’s education., Addressing the
challenges of sustainable intensiﬁcation and poverty reduction in
Africa will require many of the same types of policies and invest-
ments strategies. This, of course, implies the importance of a holistic
cross-sectoral harmonization of policies – i.e. in agricultural, land,
and urban industrial policies, as well as public investments in phys-
ical infrastructure, health, education, family planning, etc.
But within this list of essential investments, we perceive land
issues to be the most neglected. Our review of the changing rural
landscape of actors, institutions and the allocation of land
resources indicates a major ‘‘disconnect’’ between current land
allocation policies and national aspirations for inclusive economic
growth. In many countries prospects for broad-based agricultural
Table A1
Distribution of population density in rural Africa, 2010 and 2050.
% Of rural population contained in the most densely populated 1%, 10%, and 20% of
rural grid cells
Rural population per km2 arable land in the most densely populated 1%, 10%, and 20% of rural grid
cells
2010 2050
Country Top 1% Top 10% Top 20% National Top 1% Top 10% Top 20% National Top 1% Top 10% Top 20%
Angola 16 43 62 15 313 80 53 25 505 130 85
Benin 11 51 65 46 510 241 152 74 822 388 244
Botswana 18 62 77 10 178 58 41 16 286 94 67
Burkina Faso 7 30 48 41 340 120 92 65 549 194 148
Burundi 2 19 34 313 667 596 541 504 1075 960 871
Cameroon 15 56 74 28 438 158 104 45 706 254 168
Central African Republic 11 40 61 6 65 23 18 9 105 37 28
Chad 14 56 72 11 85 37 27 18 137 59 43
Congo 10 43 61 4 41 17 12 6 65 28 19
Ivory Coast 4 27 45 51 199 134 125 82 320 216 201
Djibouti 10 32 45 290 11106 2235 1218 467 17896 3601 1963
Equatorial Guinea 16 34 46 27 367 90 61 43 591 146 99
Eritrea 9 42 59 137 995 463 330 221 1603 746 531
Ethiopia 8 40 63 90 608 318 247 145 980 512 398
Gabon 31 50 62 4 216 29 16 7 347 47 26
Gambia 3 17 31 57 118 98 88 92 190 158 141
Ghana 6 30 48 75 373 202 164 121 602 326 264
Guinea 10 32 46 35 496 130 90 57 800 210 146
Guinea-Bissau 5 29 46 31 177 93 73 51 285 150 117
Kenya 18 72 89 69 990 417 269 111 1595 671 434
Lesotho 2 19 35 107 154 152 136 173 249 245 218
Liberia 14 52 66 40 584 212 134 64 942 342 216
Madagascar 14 47 64 33 594 171 113 54 957 276 182
Malawi 4 28 47 120 425 315 274 193 685 507 442
Mali 10 54 79 18 151 71 56 29 243 115 90
Mauritania 38 79 93 18 949 142 84 29 1529 229 136
Mozambique 11 42 61 20 275 86 62 33 443 138 100
Namibia 37 74 84 6 157 40 22 10 252 64 36
Niger 17 74 93 24 370 152 102 39 597 245 164
Nigeria 10 38 55 126 1385 510 364 203 2232 821 587
Rwanda 3 19 35 419 1029 783 719 675 1659 1262 1159
Senegal 9 43 62 87 1145 396 283 140 1846 639 456
Sierra Leone 5 27 44 80 303 309 212 129 489 499 342
Somalia 20 49 63 84 1898 393 260 136 3058 633 418
South Africa 19 74 90 45 651 292 189 73 1048 470 305
Sudan 17 48 66 40 1131 233 136 65 1823 376 219
Swaziland 2 14 27 73 125 99 92 118 202 159 149
Togo 6 30 49 64 308 160 167 103 496 257 269
Uganda 6 35 56 130 690 434 356 209 1113 700 574
Tanzania 8 35 52 39 448 147 105 62 722 238 169
Congo, Democratic Republic 13 45 61 24 335 110 74 38 540 177 119
Zambia 6 32 47 11 61 34 25 17 99 55 41
Zimbabwe 5 25 41 48 496 134 99 77 799 216 159
Africa 21 65 82 50 1498 322 197 81 2413 520 318
Notes: The ﬁrst three columns in this table show the percentage of the rural population residing in the most densely populated 1%, 10% and 20% of rural areas, by country. The other columns of the table show the localized
population density per km2 of arable land at the national level and then for the most densely populated 1%, 10% and 20% of 5 decimal minute gridcells. The middle columns provide these estimates for 2010 and the right-hand size
columns present those estimated for 2050. Computed by authors using 2010 data from the AfriPop population database (Linard et al., 2010). We ruled out urban areas on the basis of urban boundaries from the GRUMP database,
urban areas in the GlobCover 2009 land cover dataset, and any remaining areas with more than 1500 persons per square kilometer. We conducted our analysis at a coarser spatial resolution: 5 decimal minutes, or roughly 10 km2
at the equator. The AfriPop dataset is a ‘‘semi-modeled’’ dataset, wherein the total population within a reporting unit (such as a district) is allocated over space in a way that is weighted by remotely sensed data on land use and
land cover. In order to verify that our analysis was robust to such data assembly methods, we replicated this analysis with data from the Global Rural–Urban Mapping Project (GRUMP) described by Balk and Yetman (2004). Results
from both datasets were very similar.
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Table A2
Factors associated with household off-farm income.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Zambia Mozambique Kenya Malawi
Dependent variable: log (off-farm income)
Female head 0.339*** 0.282*** 0.273*** 0.186***
(4.77) (5.20) (3.86) (4.12)
Age of hh head 0.00789*** 0.00867*** 0.00405 0.00138
(4.03) (5.13) (1.64) (1.17)
Educ. of hh head 0.156*** 0.189*** 0.0962*** 0.0866***
(17.82) (24.27) (12.25) (16.18)
Adult equiv. in hh 0.107*** 0.134*** 0.0978*** 0.102***
(7.77) (14.00) (8.79) (9.96)
Farm size (ha) 0.00522 0.0198*** 0.100*** 0.0333
(0.46) (2.58) (6.45) (1.53)
km to nearest district town 0.00134 0.00695**
(1.40) (2.08)
km to tarmac road 0.00157 0.00263 0.00668***
(1.61) (0.56) (7.03)
hours to city 0.0102* 0.000168*** 0.0417*** 0.0381***
(1.88) (3.41) (2.87) (7.22)
log pop. density 0.0977** 0.0253 0.104 0.124***
(2.39) (0.90) (1.57) (2.82)
R-squared 0.201 0.233 0.256 0.200
N 5629 10372 2059 6364
Estimates based on OLS. t statistics in parentheses. Data sources: Zambia: Supplemental Surveys to the Central Statistical Ofﬁce Post Harvest surveys, 2001, 2004 and 2008.
Mozambique: TIA 2005/06, Ministry of Agriculture. Kenya: Tegemeo Rural Household Surveys, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2010. Malawi: Integrated Household Survey-II, 2003/04.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
14 T.S. Jayne et al. / Food Policy 48 (2014) 1–17growth are threatened by status quo land policies, which are
actively or passively supporting medium- and large-scale land
acquisitions by both domestic and foreign investors, while simulta-
neously constraining the amount of land that could potentially be
accessed by rural households in densely populated areas through
rural–rural migration. As several papers in this special issue show,
many African governments are devoting state resources to devel-
oping land for large-scale commercial investment (e.g., invest-
ments in irrigation, electriﬁcation, and road infrastructure in
‘‘block farms’’ or commercial farming zones), with little public or
scientiﬁc debate as to whether similar public investments in cus-
tomary tenure areas could generate even greater payoffs in terms
of agricultural productivity growth and poverty reduction. Instead,
rural poverty is increasingly being viewed as a problem to be
addressed through input subsidies, cash transfers, and other forms
of social protection and safety nets.
Unless corrected, such policies may effectively foreclose on
smallholder development options in the not-too-distant future,
since high levels of land concentration have all too often become
very difﬁcult to reverse (Binswanger et al., 1995). The reluctance
of ministries of agriculture and land to view poverty reduction as
part of their mandate is perversely consistent with land policies
that seek to transfer land out of customary systems – where it is
reserved for future generations of smallholder farmers – and into
private titled and state land, which tend to be less accessible for
small farm households. Institutions for protecting the stock of
unutilized land for future generations of indigenous rural popula-
tions are extremely fragile. Indeed, there are irresistible incentives
motivating the state to continue to wrest control of customary land
and allocate it to domestic and foreign investors, and to public–pri-
vate joint ventures such as block farms. These incentives include
the rising value of land for commercial exploitation since the
2008 surge in global food and energy prices, the understandable
incentives to achieve national food self-sufﬁciency, and the poten-
tial for land allocation to be an effective form of political patronage.
Under the continuation of status quo land policies, the twomost
promising avenues for improved livelihoods in the densely popu-
lated rural areas are diversiﬁcation into non-farm employmentand sustainable forms of intensiﬁcation and productivity growth
on existing lands. Achieving these goals will not be easy, but they
will be more likely to occur with an inclusive smallholder-led com-
mercialization strategy. This is because the ﬁrst-round beneﬁcia-
ries of agricultural growth generate important multiplier effects
by increasing their expenditures on a range of local off-farm and
non-farm activities that create second-round beneﬁts for a wide-
range of other households in the rural economy (Johnston and
Mellor, 1961; Mellor, 2014). The extent and magnitude of these
second round effects depend on how broadly spread the ﬁrst-
round growth is. The initial distribution of land and other produc-
tive assets will clearly affect the size of these multipliers. If
dynamic labor and services markets can be developed, then other
employment opportunities should be easier to create in the very
locations where more commercial smallholders are investing and
raising their output and productivity (Mellor, 2014).
Apart from the desirability of an inclusive growth strategy,
achieving it is likely to require greatly increased state support for
speciﬁc kinds of public investments, including education, health
and family planning, agricultural research and development, major
farmer extension programs focusing on sustainable soil fertility
management, investments in irrigation and electriﬁcation, and
other forms of infrastructural investments to leverage productive
private investment in both urban and rural areas. Despite skepti-
cism in some quarters about the prospects for achieving small-
holder-led development (Collier and Dercon, 2014), this path has
been the way out of hunger and poverty for much of Asia and, his-
torically, most other areas of the world (Lipton, 2006). Successful
small farm intensiﬁcation will also help to conserve the world’s
remaining forestland and biodiversity. For all of these reasons, it
would seemingly be in governments’ and development agencies’
interests to redouble their efforts to support small farm productiv-
ity growth.
A looming policy question is, therefore, whether agricultural
and land policy should focus on promoting efﬁciency and produc-
tivity in land use and seek to achieve poverty reduction goals
through some other means (such as social protection and transfer
programs) or whether agricultural policy should retain poverty
T.S. Jayne et al. / Food Policy 48 (2014) 1–17 15reduction as a primary goal alongside productivity and national
food security. While there has been increasing attention devoted
to how to best utilize Africa’s vast unexploited land resources, this
focus is arguably diverting attention from the longstanding and
more central development issue regarding what kind of strategy
is necessary to reduce rural poverty and promote broad-based
rural income growth. There is a strong likelihood that agricultural
and land policies and associated public investments could indeed
succeed in achieving these twin goals if the requisite political com-
mitment exists. Achieving these goals will be more likely once land
and agricultural policies are conceived of as components of an
overarching rural development strategy dedicated to broad based
structural transformation that explicitly acknowledges land con-
straints in densely populated areas, and not conﬁned to narrow
objectives of how to rapidly convert customary land to state titled
land that can then be allocated to commercial farming interests
and capitalized local entrepreneurs.
These questions are often missing from discussions of rural
development in the region. The analyses assembled within this
special issue indicate that the challenges associated with increas-
ingly limited access to land will seriously constrain opportunities
for growth and poverty reduction within the region unless they
are explicitly recognized and addressed within a holistic policy
response framework. It is our hope that this special issue of Food
Policy will further catalyze such a recognition by policy makers
and researchers concerned with the region’s development
prospects.
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